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Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral
and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Al-
though these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to
be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow
range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural
variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging
from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two
Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which
intent and mitigating circumstances influence moral judgments.
Although participants in all societies took such factors into account
to some degree, they did so to very different extents, varying in
both the types of considerations taken into account and the types of
violations to which such considerations were applied. The particular
patterns of assessment characteristic of large-scale industrialized
societies may thus reflect relatively recently culturally evolved
norms rather than inherent features of human moral judgment.
morality | intentions | cognition | culture | human universals
Although humans everywhere clearly make moral judgmentsabout others’ behavior, postulated universal features of human
moral judgment remain highly contentious (1). One putative uni-
versal is embodied in what we call the “moral intent hypothesis.” This
hypothesis, which is well-supported in large-scale industrialized soci-
eties, holds that consideration of an agent’s reasons for action—their
intentions, motivations, and circumstances—is a universal feature of
human moral judgment. By this, we mean that it is a species-typical
property of humans to take an agent’s reasons for action into account
in making most types of moral judgments, especially judgments of
moral scenarios involving harm. This hypothesis is supported by work
in experimental psychology, brain imaging, cognitive development,
evolutionary biology, and surveys of legal systems (2–7). For example,
neural imaging studies have found that the right temporoparietal
junction, thought to be centrally involved in the representation of
beliefs and intentions (8), discriminates between intentional and
accidental harms in its patterns of activity, and these patterns cor-
relate with patterns of moral judgment (9). Likewise, developmental
studies have found that sociomoral judgments of infants as young as
8 mo old are affected by the intent of an action and not simply the
outcome (10). Importantly, prior work suggests that the role of
intentions may be stronger in some domains of moral judgment
than others, with intentions playing a smaller role for judgments
about violations not involving harm, such as food taboos (3, 11).
However, there are reasons to suspect that the role of intentions
in moral judgments might not be universal across societies. An-
thropologists have suggested that the importance of intentions in
moral judgments might vary cross-culturally (1, 12–14), and some
prior studies support this possibility. For example, a study comparing
American Jews and Christians found that Christians weighed
intentions more heavily in moral judgment (15), and a study
comparing urban Americans and Japanese found that intentions
played a smaller role in the judgments of Japanese than American
participants (16).
To date, however, the vast majority of studies on the moral
intent hypothesis have been carried out in so-called Western,
educated, industrial, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies
(17), and none have been carried out in small-scale non-Western
societies. Small-scale societies provide a critical test of potential
universality under conditions very distinct from those of modern
WEIRD societies, both because of the potential for the recent
historical spread of moral and legal ideas between large-scale
societies, and because small-scale societies more closely ap-
proximate the conditions under which putative universals of
moral judgment might have evolved. To this end, we probed
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moral judgments across a sample of 10 societies on six conti-
nents, spanning a diversity of population sizes and cultural tra-
ditions (Fig. 1). Importantly, our sample included eight diverse
small-scale traditional societies, which were compared with two
Western societies (one traditional rural Western society, and one
urban industrialized society). The research performed in this
study was approved by The North General Institutional Review
Board, Office of the Human Research Protection Program, Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles; The Office of Research Human
Subjects Committee, University of California, Santa Barbara; The
Behavioural Research Ethics Board, University of British Colum-
bia; The Cambridge Humanities and Social Sciences Research
Ethics Committee, University of Cambridge; The Ethical Com-
mittee of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius
University; The Office of Research Integrity, Human Subjects,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas; and The Human Subjects Office,
University of Washington. Informed consent was obtained from all
participants before participation (SI Appendix).
Using standardized vignettes, we sought to measure how a char-
acter’s reasons for actions moderate moral judgments about that
character’s behavior across multiple contexts and dimensions. Spe-
cifically, our vignettes systematically varied whether the character’s
behavior was (i) intentional or accidental, (ii) motivated or not,
or (iii) potentially justified by mitigating factors such as insanity
or self-defense. They also included variations in context and type
of potential moral wrongdoing, including degree of harm done
(striking another person vs. poisoning an entire village) and type of
norm violated (harm, theft, violating a food taboo) (see SI Appendix
for complete study design, including full texts of the vignettes, and
additional analyses).
Participants responded to two banks of vignettes, the “Intentions
Bank” and the “Mitigating Factors Bank.” The Intentions Bank
used matched pairs of scenarios that varied information about the
perpetrator’s reasons for the actions in the story in two ways:
(i) intentional vs. accidental, and (ii) motivated vs. antimotivated. In
the intentional condition, the perpetrator was described as commit-
ting a particular act (e.g., striking another person, stealing another’s
bag) without qualification. The accidental condition held the act
constant but described it as accidental (e.g., tripping and acciden-
tally striking another person, mistaking another’s bag for one’s
own). In the motivated and antimotivated pairs, language about the
perpetrator’s intentions was omitted, and the perpetrator was de-
scribed as either having an incentive to commit the act (e.g., past
negative interactions with the person being struck, seeing expen-
sive items in another’s bag), or having an incentive not to do it
(e.g., seeking to make a good impression on the person being struck,
seeing that the bag contained nothing of value). Crossed with these
intent and motivation variation pairs were four different norm
violation scenarios: (i) physical harm (striking another person),
Fig. 1. Study populations and sample characteristics.
Table 1. Parameters of best-fit ordered logit models for Intentions Bank
Intentions Bank Estimate exp(β) Variance SD SE P
Fixed effects
High vs. Low Intent 1.62 5.05 0.428 <0.001
Sex (1 = male) −0.209 1.23 0.123 0.09
Random effects
Society 1.05 1.03
Scenario 0.848 0.921
Subject 0.807 0.898
Scenario × Society 0.638 0.799
High vs. Low Intent × Society 0.26 0.51
High vs. Low Intent × Scenario 0.25 0.501
Question item 0.065 0.255
Effects are reported in descending order of effect size within effect type (fixed, random).
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(ii) group harm (poisoning a village well), (iii) theft, and (iv) violation
of a food taboo.
Each participant heard four vignettes, one each of the intentional,
accidental, motivated, and antimotivated scenarios. Each was
assigned in pseudorandomized format to one of the four types of
norm violation (physical harm, group harm, theft, food taboo).
For each vignette, participants made six judgments, each on a
five-point scale. Three of these were moral judgment questions
designed to assess different aspects of participants’ judgments of
the moral valence of the act: “Badness” of the action (judged on
a scale from very bad, bad, neutral, good, to very good); “Punish-
ment” (whether the agent should be highly punished, punished,
neutral, rewarded, highly rewarded for the action); and “Reputation”
(whether others will think the agent a very bad person, bad, neutral,
good, or very good in light of the action). In addition, we asked three
manipulation check questions, designed to assess participants’ judg-
ments of what happened in the vignettes: “Intentional” (the degree to
which the act was intentional), “Victim Outcome” (the degree to
which the act affected the victim positively or negatively), and
“Victim Reaction” (the degree to which the victim was pleased or
angered by the event). A principal-component analysis revealed
that the moral judgment variables clustered together and separately
from the manipulation check variables (SI Appendix, section 3a).
Here, we report analyses of the moral judgment variables and how
they were influenced by society and by our experimental manipu-
lations. Additional analyses, including analyses of our manipulation
check variables and detailed breakdowns by society and scenario,
are reported in SI Appendix.
Effects of our experimental manipulations and variation across
societies on participant judgments were analyzed with ordered logit
models, using a model comparison approach to find the best-fit
model for the data (Table 1 and SI Appendix, sections 1 and 2).
Model comparison revealed that the effects of the intentional vs.
accidental and motivated vs. antimotivated manipulations were
statistically comparable and best pooled into a single binary factor,
which we call High vs. Low Intent. The ordered logit model pro-
vides an estimate of the effect of this factor on the severity of
negative moral judgments: across societies, an act committed with
High Intent (intentional or motivated) increased the odds of a one-
unit increase in severity on our moral judgment scale by a factor of
5, compared with a similar act committed with Low Intent (acci-
dental or antimotivated) (P < 0.001). In other words, acts of in-
tentional wrongdoing were five times more likely to boost negative
moral evaluations by a point on our five-point scale than were
equivalent nonintentional acts. The three moral judgment mea-
sures (Badness, Punishment, Reputation) clustered together and
closely tracked each other, consistent with evolutionary models of
cooperation, which show that negative sanctions against norm
A
B
C
Fig. 2. Intentions Bank: summaries of effects of High- vs. Low-Intent manipulation across societies (A and B) and scenarios (C). (A) Mean difference between
High- and Low-Intent conditions for three different judgment variables (Badness, Punishment, Reputation). Societies are shown in ascending order of mean
difference between High and Low Intent. (B) Mean severity of judgments for High-Intent and Low-Intent conditions, question items pooled (Badness,
Punishment, Reputation). Societies are shown in descending order of mean severity of judgment, High and Low Intent pooled. (C) Mean severity of judg-
ments by Scenario for High- vs. Low-Intent conditions, societies pooled. Scenarios are shown in descending order of mean severity of judgment, High and Low
Intent pooled. All judgments on a five-point scale, +2 to −2: +2, very bad; 0, neutral; −2, very good. Bars indicate 95% CI. n = 322.
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violators, including reputational damage and punishment, are im-
portant in stabilizing cooperation (18, 19).
Although the main effect of High vs. Low Intent in the omnibus
statistical model is consistent with the moral intent hypothesis, there
was substantial variation across societies and scenarios in the effects
of intent on moral judgment [consistent with earlier work on dif-
ferences in the role of intent across moral domains (3)]. Fig. 2 dis-
plays effects of the High- vs. Low-Intent manipulation by Society
(Fig. 2 A and B), and Scenario (Fig. 2C). Interactions between So-
ciety, Scenario, and the High- vs. Low-Intent manipulation are
shown in Fig. 3. As illustrated in Fig. 2 A and B, the effect of High vs.
Low Intent on overall severity of moral judgment across the sce-
narios varied across societies (see Intent-by-Society interaction term
in Table 1). Indeed, High vs. Low Intent had no significant overall
effect on severity of moral judgment in two societies, Yasawa and
Himba. Interestingly, Yasawa is a society in the Pacific culture area
where mental opacity norms, which proscribe speculating about the
reasons for others’ behavior in some contexts, have been reported
(13). In addition, the samples that showed the largest effects of
High vs. Low Intent on moral judgments were Los Angeles and
Storozhnitsa, the two Western societies in our sample.
Scenario had the second largest of the random effects in the
model, indicating substantial variation in moral wrongness
judgments across the four vignettes. As indicated in Fig. 2C,
there was variation in the effects of High vs. Low Intent on moral
judgments across the scenarios. Effects of intent were smallest
for Food Taboo (which only increased the odds of a one-unit
increase in severity of moral judgment by a factor of 1.5; P =
0.055) and largest for Theft (where intent increased those odds
by a factor of 20; P < 0.0001). Interestingly, although the group
harm (Poisoning) scenario showed the most severe moral bad-
ness judgments, on average, there was still a substantial effect of
Intent on severity of moral judgment (odds increase by a factor
of 7; P < 0.0001). As illustrated in Fig. 4, Poisoning was the
scenario judged to have the worst effects on the victim, followed
by Theft, Physical Harm, and Food Taboo.
In addition, there were variations in how the scenarios were
judged across societies, as illustrated in Fig. 3. Fitting an additional
model to the data (SI Appendix, section 3d) revealed a modest
three-way interaction between High vs. Low Intent, Scenario, and
Society (variance estimate, 0.23). To assess the nature of this
interaction, we computed effect sizes of interactions between So-
ciety and High vs. Low Intent for each of the scenarios separately,
and rank-ordered them from largest to smallest amount of vari-
ance explained. The scenario with the highest cross-society vari-
ance in differences between High- and Low-Intent judgments was
Theft, followed by Poisoning, Physical Harm, and Food Taboo
(effect sizes of 1.54, 0.50, 0.45, and 0.00, respectively). Thus, the
Theft scenario contributed most to cross-society variation in ef-
fects of intent on moral judgment, and Food Taboo contributed
least. This replicates and extends prior work in Western societies
showing that intentions play a smaller role in judgments of purity
violations than those involving harm (3). It also shows that non-
purity scenarios (Theft, Poisoning, Physical Harm) contributed most
to the variance in effects of intent on moral judgment across soci-
eties, with the purity violation scenario (Food Taboo) contributing
least. If the moral intent hypothesis is least applicable in the purity
domain (3), then one might expect that this is where one would find
the largest amount of cross-society variation, with less cross-society
variation in the role of intentions in nonpurity scenarios. In fact,
however, we found the reverse, with the purity scenario exhibiting
the least amount of variation in the role of intentions.
In the Mitigating Factors Bank, we investigated five factors
that might serve as justifications or excuses for engaging in oth-
erwise norm-violating behavior, thereby potentially reducing the
severity of moral judgments about the act. All scenarios involved
battery and included an Intentional condition that was comparable
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Fig. 3. Intentions Bank: interactions between Society, Scenario, and High- vs. Low-Intent manipulation. Points show mean severity of moral judgments
(Badness, Punishment, Reputation) on a five-point scale, +2 to −2: +2, very bad; 0, neutral; −2, very good. Bars indicate 95% CI. n = 322. Scenarios ordered Left
to Right in descending order of effect size of amount of variance contributed to effects of High vs. Low Intent on moral judgments across societies.
Fig. 4. Mean judgments of severity of Victim Outcome and Victim Reaction
by Scenario, pooled across societies. Bars indicate 95% CI. n = 322.
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to the intentional physical harm scenario in the Intentions Bank.
The mitigating factors investigated were (i) Self-Defense (perpe-
trator strikes someone attacking him), (ii) Necessity (perpetrator
strikes someone to access a bucket to put out a fire), (iii) Insanity
(perpetrator has a history of mental illness), (iv) Mistake of Fact
(perpetrator believes he is intervening in a fight, but the combatants
were just playing), and (v) Different Moral Beliefs (perpetrator
holds the belief that striking a weak person to toughen him up is
praiseworthy, in contrast to the prevailing view of the commu-
nity). Each participant judged three of these scenarios, using the
scales described above.
We again used ordered logit models with model comparison to
arrive at a best-fit model for our data (Table 2). As in the Inten-
tions Bank, the effect of question item (Badness, Punishment,
Reputation) was small, with these judgments tracking one another
across scenarios. As expected, variation in mitigating factors had a
large effect on participants’ judgments; Mitigating Factor was the
largest of the random effects in the best-fit model, indicating
substantial cross-societal consistency in ranking of the factors,
although there was also a modest Mitigating Factor-by-Society
interaction, indicating some societal variation in the role of
mitigating factors in moral judgment.
Fig. 5 shows the effect of different mitigating factors on the
severity of moral judgments across societies. Across all societies,
Intentional and Different Moral Beliefs were judged most
harshly; in no society was Different Moral Beliefs mitigating
compared with Intentional battery. Slightly below these in severity,
but still judged negatively across societies, were the Mistake of Fact
and Insanity scenarios, with these being highly mitigating in some
societies (e.g., Los Angeles, Storozhnitsa) but not at all mitigating
in others (e.g., Yasawa).
Virtually all societies viewed Self-Defense and Necessity as
highly mitigating factors, with negative moral judgments often
reduced to zero or near zero (i.e., neutral), and even toward
morally positive in Western societies: Self-Defense was judged
praiseworthy in Los Angeles and Storozhnitsa, as was Necessity
(striking someone to access a bucket to put out a fire) in Storozhnitsa.
In addition, Los Angeles and Storozhnitsa showed the largest effects
of mitigating factors on moral judgments. Notably, Self-Defense and
Necessity were considered mitigating in Yasawa, where we had not
seen discrimination in moral judgments between High- and Low-
Intent scenarios. In addition to the model reported in Table 2, in
which mitigating factor is treated as a random effect, we created a
binary fixed factor, High-Mitigating (Self-Defense and Necessity) vs.
Low-Mitigating (all other scenarios), to estimate the effects of High
vs. Low Mitigation on the odds of increased severity in moral judg-
ments (SI Appendix, section 4). Low-Mitigating situations (i.e., situ-
ations other than Self-Defense or Necessity) increased the odds of
severe judgments by a factor of 25 compared with High-Mitigating
situations (P < 0.0001).
Our results yield several main conclusions. On the one hand,
participants in all 10 societies moderated moral judgments in
light of agents’ intentions, motivations, or mitigating circum-
stances in some way. On the other hand, the societies studied
exhibited substantial variation not only in the degree to which
such factors were viewed as excusing, but also in the kinds of
factors taken to provide exculpatory excuses, and in the types of
norm violations for which such factors were seen as relevant.
Thus, we can distinguish between two versions of the moral
intent hypothesis: a strong version and a weak version. The
strong moral intent hypothesis that we outlined above holds that
it is a species-typical property of humans to take an agent’s
reasons for action into account in making most types of moral
judgments, especially judgments of moral scenarios involving
harm. On this hypothesis, it would be natural to suppose that
reasons for action would play much the same role in moral
reasoning across societies, with intentional actions being judged
worse than accidental ones, especially in the case of harm. This
hypothesis was not supported by our data. There was large variation
across societies in the role that intentions played in moral judgment.
In some scenarios, such as Poisoning and Theft, intentions played a
large role in some societies (Los Angeles, Storozhnitsa) and little or
Table 2. Parameters of best-fit ordered logit models for
Mitigating Factors Bank
Mitigating
Factors Bank Estimate exp(β) Variance SD SE P
Fixed effects
Sex (1 = male) −0.26 1.30 0.173 0.133
Random effects
Mitigating Factor 3.13 1.77
Subject 1.6 1.27
Society × Mitigating 0.725 0.851
Society 0.369 0.608
Question item 0.0685 0.262
Effects are reported in descending order of effect size within effect type
(fixed, random).
Fig. 5. Mitigating Factors Bank: effects of mitigating factors across societies. Bars show mean severity of judgments for six mitigating factors conditions,
question items pooled (Badness, Punishment, Reputation). Societies are shown in descending order of mean severity of judgment (across mitigating factors),
and mitigating factors are shown in descending order of mean severity of judgment (across societies). All judgments on a five-point scale, +2 to −2: +2, very
bad; 0, neutral; −2, very good. Bars indicate 95% CI. n = 322.
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none in others (Hadza, Himba, and Yasawa; Fig. 3), despite these
being judged as the most harmful scenarios across societies.
The weak moral intent hypothesis, on the other hand, holds
that intentions and other reasons for action play some role in
moral psychology in all societies, although that role might vary by
society and by context. This version of the moral intent hypothesis
was indeed supported by our data. In every society, for example,
Self-Defense and Necessity were treated as legitimate excuses that
mitigated the moral badness of a harmful act (battery). Moreover,
nearly every society, with the exception of Yasawa, showed an ef-
fect of High vs. Low Intent on moral judgments in one or more
scenarios in the Intentions Bank. Indeed, the High- vs. Low-Intent
manipulation explained the largest amount of variance in judgment
across societies in the Intentions Bank, with an effect size that was
much larger than the Society-by-Intent interaction (Table 1). The
support we found for the weak moral intent hypothesis makes
sense, as evolutionary considerations support the idea that agents
with the ability to monitor mental states might benefit from using
intent as a predictive index of future behavior. Interestingly, no
society considered different moral beliefs to be a mitigating factor
in harmful acts, suggesting that at least a weak form of moral ob-
jectivism might be culturally universal or nearly so.
Our findings do not suggest that intentions and other reasons
for action are not important in moral judgment. Instead, what
they suggest is that the roles that intentions and reasons for
action play in moral judgment are not universal across cultures,
but rather, variable. One way of interpreting this is that reasoning
about the sources of an agent’s action—using theory of mind and
other evolved abilities (20)—is universally available as a resource
for moral judgments, but it might not always be used in the same
way, or even at all, in particular cases. Even in societies where we
found a strong role for intentional inference in moral judgments,
such as Los Angeles, there are domains where intentions do not
matter, such as domains of “strict liability” (e.g., speeding).
Our study was not designed to test particular theories that
might explain the societal-level variation we subsequently ob-
served. That said, it is interesting to note that among the soci-
eties we sampled, the two that showed the largest overall effects
of intentions and mitigating factors were the two most Western
societies, Los Angeles and Storozhnitsa. This is consistent with
the fact that most prior studies of the moral intent hypothesis,
which have found strong effects of intentions on moral judg-
ments, have been conducted in the West. However, the finding
that smaller-scale societies showed more modest and variable
effects of intentions suggests that the extremity of Westerners in
this regard may reflect not an inherent feature of human moral
evaluation, but rather the influence of norms generated by cul-
tural evolution within the last few millennia. Although our study
design does not allow us to do more than conjecture in this
regard, our findings suggest that future research might reveal a
relationship between the scale and structure of human societies
and their norms of moral judgment. For example, it is possible
that in large-scale societies where disputes must often be adju-
dicated by third parties on the basis of explicit standards of
evidence, norms involving reasons for action might become
more elaborate via processes of cultural evolution. Other factors
may also be important, such as the presence or absence of witch-
craft, where the overactive attribution of malevolent feelings
(e.g., envy) to others—feelings that are in turn taken to be re-
sponsible for much sickness, injury, and death—can lead to cycles
of violence and revenge, or notions of corporate responsibility in
which members of a group, such as a kin group, are collectively
held responsible for wrongdoings of individual members. Alterna-
tively, it may be that the best explanation of the patterns of variation
we found will take a different form, for example, in terms of evoked
culture, or that cross-society variation in norms of moral reasoning
is more haphazard, arising from processes of cultural drift in which
idiosyncratic historical factors result in different constellations of
moral norms and patterns of judgment across societies. Exploration
of the question of whether there is meaningful patterning to the
differences in moral reasoning we have observed across societies,
functional or otherwise, and examination of different explanatory
factors and frameworks, are important topics for future work.
We close by reiterating the importance of cross-cultural work,
particularly in small-scale, non-WEIRD societies, for the study
of human universals (17). Our results were unanticipated given
the broad support for the moral intent hypothesis derived from
multiple methodologies in large-scale Western societies. By us-
ing a set of standardized vignettes across a diverse sample of
societies, we were able to document aspects of moral judgment
that appear to be universal across societies (e.g., the roles of Self-
Defense and Necessity), as well as aspects of moral judgment
that appear to be highly variable (e.g., the role of intentions in
morally evaluating an extreme harm, the poisoning of a village
well). Not only does this kind of comparative work across diverse
societies allow us to amend conclusions about human nature based
solely on Western samples, it also allows us to produce more
nuanced and detailed descriptions of the specific dimensions along
which human psychology varies, and does not, across the globe.
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